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L’Afrique du Sud, comme beaucoup de pays de l’hémisphère Sud, a connu une croissance explosive 
de la population urbaine au cours des dernières décennies. L'essentiel de cette croissance de 
population urbaine vit dans des bidonvilles densément peuplés qui souvent ne sont pas aménagés et 
manquent d’infrastructures adéquates - en particulier l'assainissement urbain - qui entraine des 
problèmes environnementaux et de santé majeurs. Ce document décrit ce qui s'est passé à Kosovo, 
un bidonville du Cap, après une amélioration des conditions de vie sur place par l’installation d’un 
système d'assainissement urbain modernisé et exceptionnellement sophistiqué pour ce type 
d’aménagement, comprenant un système d'assainissement sous vide et un réseau d'égouts à ciel 
ouvert, qui, bien qu'en apparence techniquement adéquat, n'a pas réussi à répondre aux besoins des 
résidents. Les données ethnographiques et observationnelles ont montré quels genres de problèmes 
ont empêché la nouvelle infrastructure de répondre aux besoins en assainissement urbain du 
bidonville, mais aussi comment ces problèmes sont survenus. Ces données montrent que les 
influences combinées des barrières sociales et physiques peuvent entraîner la dérive de tout projet 
entrepris dans de tels quartiers. Dans le cadre de la préparation du projet, il est donc impératif 
d'examiner et traiter soigneusement les aspects sociaux et institutionnels en plus de répondre aux 
exigences techniques.  
 
ABSTRACT 
South Africa, like many countries of the “Global South”, has witnessed an explosive growth in urban 
population in recent decades. Most of this urban growth is accommodated in densely populated 
informal settlements which are often unplanned and lacking adequate engineering services – in 
particular urban drainage – resulting in major environmental and health problems. This paper 
describes what happened in Kosovo, a shantytown in Cape Town, following an in-situ upgrade that 
included installation of a retro-fitted and unusually sophisticated urban drainage system for this type of 
settlement – including vacuum sewerage and a network of open drains – that has failed to meet 
residents’ needs although seemingly technically adequate. Ethnographic and observational data have 
shown the kinds of problems that have prevented the new infrastructure from addressing the urban 
drainage needs of the settlement and how they came about. It shows that the combined influence of 
social and physical barriers can result in the derailment of any project undertaken in such settlements 
and that it is thus imperative that, in addition to addressing the technical requirements of such a 








There are vast differences between the cities of the “Global North” and the cities of the “Global South”. 
The latter are typically fast growing, poorly-planned, badly managed, inadequately resourced, and 
contain many destitute people living in very difficult – and often life-threatening – circumstances. The 
situation is particularly bad in Africa. In 2008, the continent was the least urbanised region in the world 
with only 39.1% of its population living in cities, but this is expected to grow to over 50% by 2030, the 
majority – by implication over 380 million – in slums and informal settlements (UN-HABITAT, 2008). 
Even in South Africa, by far the wealthiest country on the continent, shantytowns have become 
ubiquitous on the outskirts of towns and cities. These shantytowns are home to millions of people. 
According to StatsSA (2009), 13.4% of households in 2008 lived in informal dwellings (shacks) in 
South Africa (total population was about 48 million). In the City of Cape Town (CoCT) alone, a city of 
about 3.3 million people, there are currently some 140,000 shacks in an estimated 230 informal 
settlements (CoCT, 2009a). Residents live in conditions of considerable deprivation in flimsy shelters 
with floor areas generally less than 20 m2 and largely constructed from scavenged materials such as 
corrugated galvanised iron, plastic, cardboard or timber sheeting. In some areas, shack densities 
exceed 200 dwelling units per hectare (du/ha).  
The services provided to these shantytowns are usually very basic. In South Africa, the local 
authorities usually provide little more than a handful of communal standpipes where the inhabitants 
can obtain potable water, a few communal toilets – which are all too frequently broken – and a 
rudimentary litter removal service. Very few settlements are adequately drained, in part because many 
settlements are a consequence of illegal land invasions in areas where local authorities have limited 
jurisdiction, in part because it is very difficult to retrofit existing, very dense developments and in part 
because local authorities lack the financial and human resources to plan and execute proper 
settlement drainage. Unfortunately, even where a local authority has attempted to provide drainage, it 
frequently fails for a variety of reasons, often as a consequence of not adequately engaging with the 
residents before, during and after the provision of the service. Failure to provide adequate urban 
drainage results in unhygienic environments that exacerbate the disease burden on those least able to 
cope – many of them having HIV- compromised immune systems. 
During the course of 2008/9, the CoCT provided the residents of Kosovo, a local shantytown housing 
approximately 15,625 people in 6,250 shacks (CoCT, 2009b) with a relatively sophisticated urban 
drainage system – comprising vacuum sewerage and a combination of open channels and pipes for 
stormwater – that is currently not operating as intended. This paper briefly describes the settlement, 
the services provided and the outcome of ethnographic research carried out by researchers from the 
University of Cape Town (UCT) to understand the inhabitants’ responses to the provision of these 
services. The paper shows that Kosovo is a good example of how well-meaning attempts to provide 
urban drainage can fail in the absence of in-depth engagement with the intended beneficiaries. 
 
Figure 1: Location of Cape Town (left) and a view down one of the main streets of Kosovo (right)  
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2. KOSOVO INFORMAL SETTLEMENT 
2.1 Physical description 
Kosovo informal settlement is situated in the suburb of Philippi in the Cape Flats area of Cape Town. 
The area is essentially flat and is covered with unconsolidated sandy soils overlying Malmesbury shale 
bedrock (Cape Flats, 2009). There is a high water table close to the ground surface which exacerbates 
flooding in the winter rain season (May to August). The average annual precipitation in the region is 
approximately 515 mm (WeatherSA, 2009). 
 
2.2 Social profile 
In 2008 Kosovo covered an area of about 27 hectares at a population density of approximately 580 
inhabitants per hectare and a shack density of 230 du/ha (CoCT, 2009). It was established in the 
1990s as a result of a planned land invasion. A social survey conducted in 2004 by ARG Design 
(2006) indicated a young population with the majority of the residents falling in the 21-40 years age 
category and a large number of children below 6 years of age. Many shacks housed single men living 
on their own. There were also a large number of woman-headed households with dependants. The 
same survey recorded high levels of poverty with an unemployment rate of approximately 51%.  
 
2.3 Provision of urban drainage 
Initially Kosovo had very little in the way of engineering services other than potable water distributed to 
communal tap-stands dotted around the settlement, limited refuse removal and a “bucket sanitation 
system” serviced by a contractor appointed by the CoCT. The bucket system is prevalent throughout 
Africa; inhabitants defecate into a bucket which is periodically emptied and/or replaced. At first there 
was no formal stormwater drainage so heavy winter rainfall resulted in the shacks being surrounded, 
and sometimes inundated, by a toxic cocktail of stormwater mixed with greywater (from the tap-
stands), urban refuse and even faecal matter from the inadequate sanitation provision.  
Recognition of Kosovo’s poor living conditions led the CoCT to appoint Engineering Consultants in 
2003 to investigate potential improvements. Consultation meetings were held between the CoCT, the 
Consultants and persons said to represent residents. As regards sanitation services, residents 
reportedly expressed a clear preference for flush toilets as opposed to any other system – possibly 
because this is what one finds in the city’s more affluent areas where some of them were employed. 
The Consultants, in conjunction with the CoCT, thus sought a flush toilet solution for Kosovo’s sewage 
removal. However, various factors, including; the extreme flatness of the site, its high water table, its 
unstructured and extremely dense distribution of dwellings leading to lack of space suitable for the 
installation of engineering services, and residents’ intense reluctance to be moved to make way for its 
construction, meant that installation of a conventional gravity sewerage system would be disruptive 
and considerably more costly than for an equivalent “green fields” site. An alternative method of 
sewerage conveyance was thus sought and the Consultants proposed a vacuum collection system for 
sewage emanating from communal blocks equipped with flush toilets. Communal toilets were 
proposed for reasons of inadequate financial resources to provide every household in the informal 
settlement with its own toilet, and because the site was seen as a temporary housing area that would 
eventually be cleared, its residents being accommodated in formal housing elsewhere. Stormwater 
drainage was to be effected through open drains running between the shacks and draining into a pipe 
system constructed under the main access routes which were formalised into proper roads with kerbs 
and bitumen surfaces (Figure 2a). Drainage from communal tap-stands was also to be improved – 
resulting in direct discharge into the stormwater pipe system, although the communal toilet blocks 
were designed to have wash basins alongside and draining into the sewer system. Solid waste 
removal from site was coordinated by the CoCT – residents being supplied with two black refuse bags 
on a weekly basis which, once full, were taken to central points and deposited in large metal 
containers (skips) which are periodically removed by the CoCT to landfill sites.   
The advantages of vacuum sewerage are that it enables the installation of conventional flush toilets 
without the need for deep trenches, numerous deep – and expensive – access chambers (manholes), 
and the need to always travel in straight lines, as is customary with waterborne sewerage. Vacuum 
sewerage also allows for reduced diameter pipelines as it works at much higher effective velocities 
than a gravity system. As constructed, the system comprises communal sanitation blocks containing 
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varying numbers of flush toilet cubicles with wash basins installed at one or both ends where residents 
can do their laundry and other domestic washing and collect water for cooking, cleaning and other 
household tasks (Figure 2b). The toilets and the washbasins are ultimately drained by gravity through 
110 mm diameter uPVC pipes to collection chambers where the sewage gathers until there is 
sufficient volume to promote the opening of an interface valve linking the collection chamber to the 
vacuum reticulation system. When the interface valve opens, the sewage is sucked into the vacuum 
reticulation and travels in stages to a single centrally located pump station through 90 to 160 mm 
diameter pipes that are laid at depths between 1.2 and 1.5 m. The conventional alternative would have 
used 160 mm diameter pipes installed at depths of up to 7m and incorporating three lift stations 
(CoCT, 2009b). Being able to use relatively shallow trenches reduced the disruption caused by the 
retrofit on the surrounding shacks by minimising the number of shacks that had to be moved to allow 
construction. It also facilitated the use of local labour instead of having to bring in mechanical trench 
diggers. Sewage from the pump station is pumped to the city sewerage and thence travels to the 
wastewater treatment works. Unfortunately the savings in the construction of the reticulation system 
and pump stations were, to some extent, cancelled by the high cost of the collection chambers and 




Figure 2: Open drains (left), communal toilet blocks in Kosovo (right) 
 
3. METHOD 
An ethnographic study of responses to the new urban drainage system – focusing primarily on the 
vacuum sewerage – was undertaken from 8 June to 17 July 2009. For part of the time, a Social 
Anthropology student resided in the settlement. The student used participant observation and 
conducted open-ended, informal interviews with; 23 Kosovo residents, the Kosovo upgrade project 
manager in the City of Cape Town Informal Settlement Housing Department, the two officials from City 
of Cape Town Informal Settlement Unit, Water & Sanitation Department who had to take over the 
administration and maintenance of the system post installation, the Ward 33 Councillor, the 
engineering Consultant who designed the sewage system, and the contractor hired to monitor the new 
infrastructure in Kosovo. Other UCT researchers from the Civil Engineering Department undertook 
inspections of the sewerage installation and the surrounding area. 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Sewerage 
Even before the project had been completed and formally handed over to residents, problems with the 
sewerage installation surfaced. Residents reported the collection chambers were intermittently 
overflowing, and sewage apparently backing up to, and flowing out of, the drains installed directly 
below the washbasins, in some cases flooding neighbouring shacks with sewage. Some residents had 
covered the problem drains with wooden boards, bricks or whatever material was available in order to 
stop the spillage (Figure 3). Inspection of the overflowing collection chambers showed that they had 
been blocked by large amounts of solids including large sticks, bricks, newspaper and leaflets – 
blockages that had then caused sewage build up in the collection chambers until they ultimately 
overflowed into the surrounding manhole and back up the drains. From time to time the sensor tubes 
for the interface valves were also blocked with sewage to the extent that, even after the collection 
chamber and manhole were cleared, the vacuum valves remained closed as the blocked sensor tube 
still indicated that the valves were open. 
 
 
Figure 3: Drain under washbasin covered by residents (left) and overflowing (right)  
 
Observation revealed that maintenance personnel had not understood the finer points of the vacuum 
sewerage system’s operation resulting in a cycle of sewage build up and removal being regularly 
repeated without the root causes of the blockage being addressed. As one local resident observed: 
“Some other day there was a blockage and there were some guys from the City of Cape Town that 
came to unblock the pump station. And then I asked them why they leave, because they left without 
solving the problem. They said, ‘No. The system that was put there was vacuum pumps’ so they don’t 
know anything about it. They were going to bring people who know about the vacuum pumps”. 
Another said: “They don’t send people to fix. They only send people to suck [sewage and garbage 
from toilet basins]. You know? This is a bucket system now. This is not a flushing system.” – by which 
she meant that the maintenance personnel treated the system as they would a bucket system where 
they simply collect the waste material. That said, however, once the technicalities had been explained 
to the maintenance staff they soon understood to replace the waterlogged sensor units with dry ones.  
Residents were eager to talk about and demonstrate the problems they were having with the toilets. 
They also demonstrated measures they had attempted to prevent the sewage overflow from the 
drains, including locking the toilet cubicles and closing the toilets’ water supply to prohibit their use. 
Tragically the new vacuum sewerage system, designed to replace bucket toilets is currently 
unsuccessful. The system’s failure has reportedly led residents to conclude that bucket toilets are 
preferable to communal toilets that don’t work – a factor exacerbating dislike of communal toilet blocks 
for their inconvenience, particularly at night when residents were observed using buckets in their 
homes and discarding the contents wherever convenient, As one resident said of the new system: 
“Buckets are better than these toilets because these toilets are only toys. They are not working!” 
Some of the CoCT’s maintenance personnel for the system – officials and contractors – suggested to 
the researchers that in some cases residents had intentionally damaged the toilets and continued to 
use blocked toilets even after others had informed them that they were blocked. They suggested that 
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these may have been acts of sabotage by those residents who were unhappy with the services 
provided. The researchers were told that the residents are divided politically with one faction – located 
in one section of the settlement – wanting the system to fail. They were also told that some individuals 
had been observed using the blocked toilets in communal facilities a distance from their own homes, 
apparently not caring about the danger of overflows into nearby shacks. Whilst no resident admitted to 
intentionally damaging the system, some residents blamed the damage on small children who use the 
area in and around the communal facilities as playgrounds since there is nowhere safe for them to 
play. Apparently children had been seen putting solids into the system. The large amounts of solids 
observed in the collection chambers could also indicate the difficulties poverty-stricken informal 
settlement residents face in purchasing appropriate anal cleansing materials (i.e. toilet paper). 
Whatever the reasons, it is apparent that several social factors should have been investigated and 
addressed as part of the upgrade and installation of a vacuum sewerage system.   
 
4.2 Stormwater 
The stormwater drains that were installed as part of the same upgrade have also proved to be 
inadequate for curbing flooding, especially during heavy rains as were experienced shortly after 
completion, the winter rains of 2009 being particularly heavy (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Flooding in Kosovo in the winter of 2009 (left) and the floor of a typical shack after inundation (right)  
 
One resident commented: “There are also drains on the sides of these roads, but all of these drains 
are useless because they can’t take the amount of water they are supposed to take. Even if you look 
at those drains they are all the time full of dirty bad smelling water. This shows that these drains 
cannot really absorb the water simply because of the smaller sizes of the pipes going underground. 
Also that is why when it is hot you find lots of flies and mosquitoes”. Another added: “The rain is hell 
for us. The rain is supposed to be a joyful thing. They say, our ancestors, as Blacks, when it comes to 
rain there will come a beautiful thing. The grass will be green and everything. But now, we don’t 
appreciate it…what rain is coming to bring us…it brings us damages”.  
Problems arise even when it is not actually raining. One woman told of ponding in the stormwater 
drains near her home and of overflows onto the road and up over the curb onto land near her shack. 
This, in combination with leaky taps at the nearbv communal toilet facility and overflowing sewage 
from it, led the dirty water from the street to flow directly into her shack. As she said: “In the street it is 
also full of water. Where am I going to put the water? I just dig a hole. And here when you dig, the 
water comes out easily [high water table]. I have to stay with the water in my shack with my children.” 
Interviews with CoCT officials revealed that some flooding had even occurred during the construction 
period before the rainy season. Residents reportedly blamed the contractors who then had to address 
the problem. A spokesperson from the Contractors responded by saying: “While we were on the 
project, there were quite a few days of flooding and then obviously it was blamed on the contractor, 
unfairly so because they’ve always had flooding seeing that they are located in a low lying area. 
Because it was a highly politicized time, with two factions within the Kosovo area, obviously [flooding] 
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made a political football and put a lot of pressure on us as the team to resolve flooding issues. It could 
only be done on a basis of, flooding is located there, let’s clear that area, let’s fill it up, and then those 
people are happy until the next time it floods next door because all you’ve done is you’ve shifted the 
problem.”  
The residents’ comments about the stormwater system imply two things. Firstly, the system’s 
inadequate capacity; the open drains did not seem up to the task of conveying all the stormwater 
resulting from heavier downpours, especially since the pipes appeared too small to take the solid 
waste that had accumulated in the open drains and was now carried along in the stormwater. 
Secondly, drainage systems in such environments can very quickly become breeding grounds for 
pathogens thus almost certainly increasing the disease burden on residents in the settlement. 
Inquisitive young children playing in the contaminated water are particularly vulnerable. Behind this 
though are the difficulties created by the fact that Kosovo came about as the result of a land invasion 
and thus had to be “retrofitted” after the construction of the dwellings. A further constraint is the lack of 
cadastral boundaries demarcating plot sizes and consequent ownership.  
 
4.3 Greywater and solid waste 
Removal of greywater (here understood as domestic wastewater, irrespective of its origin).from 
Kosovo was also a major problem; residents were observed throwing dirty water from cooking, 
cleaning and bathing into the stormwater drains alongside their dwellings (Figure 5a). Food particles 
were thus caught in those drains and added to the mounds of litter discarded there by residents 
because of the inconvenient placement of rubbish tips. Moreover, the poor design of the rubbish tip 
sites, combined with inadequate capacity frequently resulted in solid waste deposits mounting up 
around the containers (Figure 5b) with some of the waste then being blown, carried by dogs, or 
washed into the stormwater drains and exacerbating the drainage problem. With such items in the 
stormwater drains, they soon filled up with polluted standing water. 
 
Figure 5: Disposal of greywater into the stormwater drains (left) and a typical solid waste collection site (right)  
 
4.4 Information dissemination 
At least some of the problems identified by the researchers might have been mitigated by adequate 
information dissemination. Although an information dissemination campaign was designed by the 
CoCT, the researchers found posters, intended to inform residents about the vacuum sewage system 
and how it should be used, still stockpiled in the pump station well after the system was in general use. 
One ward councillor (elected to represent a demarcated municipal area) commented: “We were told 
that the sewage system is actually a German pilot project. It was first used in Africa, in Botswana and 
so on and so forth. But they were unable to tell us exactly…what are the challenges, advantages, and 
disadvantages of that system. We were raising issues, for instance, there is congestion in the area 
and what we were proposing in the community before that…is for the area to be de-densified before 
anything can be done”. A resident added: “What we need… is the municipality to come to the 
community and ask the community ‘What would be alright for you?’ It’s us who use these. We know 
what is right for the squatter camps”. Such comments suggest that residents were not formally 
informed when the toilets were complete and ready for use, let alone properly involved in decisions 
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about the system. One resident commented “The person that built the toilet here, he just built the 
toilet, and he didn’t come maybe after a week when they finish and say ‘you must use it now’. They 
must come and check if the toilet is right”. Even though CoCT officials and their consultants did hold 
some meetings with residents, it is evident that those were inadequate. Much more participatory 
programmes involving residents more closely in all decision making are required if they are to be 
sufficiently inclusive to be effective in gaining residents’ commitment to working with new 
infrastructure; holding one or two community meetings will not suffice. In this instance, with a new 
technology having been introduced, the lack of information dissemination was a problem also for 
maintenance personnel. Their unfamiliarity with the system has resulted in wastages of time, effort and 
money. 
In defence of the CoCT, the city faces considerable challenges in retrospectively providing urban 
drainage for a large semi-destitute population with limited resources. With facilities being used by large 
numbers of people, often competing for access at peak times, abuse is highly likely. The selection of 
materials for such facilities must be carefully considered for purposes of durability and robustness to 
accommodate high usage frequencies whilst also addressing the threat of theft; a brass fitting can 
quickly become a meal ticket for a hungry person. Measures to ensure that the facilities are not 
vandalised are also imperative – as are measures to deal with political divisions such as those that led 
to reported vandalisation in Kosovo.  
 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Some recommendations to the local authority and their consultants on possible methods of addressing 
the challenges encountered with the provision of urban drainage in the Kosovo informal settlement in 
particular are listed below: 
 Introduction of a threefold integrated campaign aimed at residents that includes: 
o Establishment of a carefully regulated process through which residents are assisted in procuring 
appropriate anal cleansing materials (i.e. toilet paper). It is likely that this would assist 
enormously in curbing solids disposal into the system – although doing that in just one 
settlement might well create inter-settlement tensions.  
o Institution of a campaign run repeatedly over a period of at least one year to inform all residents 
about the system, its operation, their responsibilities as users, and the procedures to be 
followed if they encounter problems with it. This could be carried out by going door-to-door or 
through local organisations such as churches, burial societies, schools etc. 
o Institution of a careful consultative and well-mediated process, that includes all local leaders and 
residents, whereby each toilet cubicle in each communal block is allocated to a specified set of 
households, and a programme instituted to provide sufficient locks and keys for that purpose. If 
toilets are to be properly maintained, it is important that residents are able to control access to 
them. 
 Periodic training workshops should be held for maintenance personnel. The operation of the 
specific alternative technology, maintenance requirements and methods of troubleshooting should 
be clearly explained. Support measures for maintenance personnel should be put in place. Making 
use of local labour for maintenance jobs can also serve as a method of creating employment for 
community residents. 
 The installation of solids interceptor tanks directly before the collection chambers could reduce 
failure of the interface valves. The levels of these tanks should be monitored by residents paid to 
take on the task, who will then notify the maintenance personnel when the tanks require emptying. 
Alternatively the installation of level indicators in the collection chambers would assist specifically 
recruited residents and maintenance staff to identify when the collection chambers experience 
blockages. 
 All components used in the communal sanitation facilities should be constructed with highly 
durable materials with negligible scrap value and securely fitted.    
 The open drain system needs to be redesigned and possibly increased in size so that it does not 




South Africa, like many countries of the “Global South”, has witnessed an explosive growth in urban 
population in recent decades. Most of this urban growth is accommodated in densely populated 
informal settlements which are often unplanned and lacking adequate engineering services – in 
particular urban drainage – resulting in major environmental and health problems. 
This paper describes what has happened in Kosovo, a shantytown in Cape Town, following an in-situ 
upgrade of the urban drainage system that has failed to meet residents’ needs even though the 
upgrade was to a higher level of sophistication than is normal for a settlement of this type – including 
vacuum sewerage and a network of open drains. Whilst there was nothing inherently wrong with the 
technical specifications, ethnographic and observational data have shown the kinds of problems that 
have prevented the new infrastructure from addressing the urban drainage needs of the settlement 
and how they came about. Its main finding is that, despite demonstrated success elsewhere of the 
kinds of technology introduced, it failed in this instance because the implementation failed to 
adequately take into account the circumstances of those whom it was intended to service. The 
personnel who were meant to maintain it were also inadequately briefed. It suggests that, had there 
been provision for an intensive process of participatory consultation with the intended beneficiaries of 
the upgrade, and had the process not been affected by local manifestations of national political 
divisions, a greater degree of success might have been achieved. All parties to such upgrades need to 
be able to know about and understand their respective needs and constraints, something that is best 
achieved through thoroughly participatory processes of engagement. 
Observation of what followed the installation of a vacuum sewerage system as part of a shantytown 
upgrade in Cape Town’s Kosovo settlement has highlighted the complexity of the process of the 
provision of sanitation and urban drainage services to South African informal settlements. It has shown 
that the combined influence of social and physical barriers can result in the derailment of any project 
undertaken in such settlements and that it is thus imperative that, in addition to addressing the 
technical requirements of such a project, the social and institutional aspects be carefully considered 
and addressed as part of the project design. 
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